Teaching and research position (post-doctoral position) Research interests
  • Corruption, governance, and institutions
  • Evaluation of public policies
  • Applied Econometrics
  • Public finances
  • Economic history
  • Applied Microeconomics/Applied Macroeconomics
Bureau 254 Téléphone 3334 Email Adresse ENSAI
Campus de Ker Lann
51 Rue Blaise Pascal
BP 37203
35172 BRUZ Cedex

 Personal Website here


Current Position and Affiliations

Oct. 2023 - Sept. 2024: Teaching and research position (post-doctoral position)in Economics at ENSAI - CREST

Since Feb 2022 - Member of American Economic Association (AEA).


Sept 2021-August 2023 Temporary Teaching and Research Associate (ATER) in Economics, Paris Nanterre University (392h=198h + 194h).

Researcher at EconomiX - CNRS (UMR 7235) - Paris Nanterre University.



Oct. 2018- Sept. 2022 - PhD in Economics, EconomiX, Paris Nanterre University

Topic: Corruption in Africa: effect on resource allocation and the role of leadership (Ph.D. defense: September 30, 2022)

Supervisor: Luc-Désiré OMGBA, Professor of Economics, University of Lorraine, France

Jury members:

  • Pr. Pascale Combes Motel, Reviewer - University of Clermont Auvergne
  • Pr. Dramane Coulibaly, Reviewer - University of Lumière Lyon 2
  • Dr. Christian Ebeke, Examiner - International Monetary Fund –IMF-
  • Pr. Elise Huillery, Examiner - Paris Dauphine University, PSL
  • Pr. Valérie Mignon, President - Paris Nanterre University


2018: Master in International Affairs and Development, International Economics and Development type course, with high honours, Paris Dauphine University, France


 Teachings: (672 hours)

2023 - 2024: Teaching and research position in Economics at ENSAI 

 Lectures: International Economics, Macroeconomics

 Tutorials: Applied Econometrics, Microeconomics, Development Economics

 Supervision: Economic projects (8 groups)


Publications (peer-reviewed)


This study investigates the effect of corruption on the trade-off between capital and current expenditures in a panel of 48 African countries over the period 2000–2016. Based on statistical yearbooks, we compile disaggregated data on public finances for African countries and find that a high prevalence of corruption distorts the composition of public expenditures at the expense of the share of capital expenditure. Specifically, an increase in corruption by one standard deviation is associated with a decrease in the proportion of capital expenditure from 29 to 18%. The results are robust to various specifications and estimation methods, including the fixed effects and instrumental variables approach. The supportive argument demonstrates that it seems more beneficial for corrupted bureaucrats to manipulate public spending in favor of current rather than capital expenditures. The latter relies on formal and traceable procedures, whereas current expenditure is known to be more open to the use of discretionary allocation.


Presentations: International Conference on Culture, Institutions and Economic Development, Italy (2019), Centre for the Study of African Economies - CSAE -  Conference 2021: Economic Development in Africa, United Kingdom (2021).



Working Papers 

  • "Corruption and occupational choice: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa" with Luc Désiré Omgbab, Eric Wouabe Djimeu, Eric Gabin Kilama (Soumis à Journal of Public Economics)


This paper assesses the incentive effect of corruption on occupational choice. Based on survey data and information about actual wages, including allowances per position in the civil service, we provide a new measure of public officials' corruption based on the difference between the perceived and actual wages for each position. With this measure, we find that corruption increases the civil service choice for a professional career. Evidence across alternative scenarios and methodologies, including instrumental variables, suggests this effect is causal. This finding explains, in part, the constraints associated with the job market and the rush to the civil service in Africa.

Presentations: International Conference on Development Economics (2022), Brown Bag Seminar at ENSAI (2024), Centre for the Study of African Economies - CSAE -  Conference 2024: Economic Development in Africa, United Kingdom (2024).


  • "Corruption and leadership in Africa: Evidence from Burkina Faso,” Miméo


This study assesses the role of a leader in anti-corruption fighting in Africa. It focuses on the rule of Thomas Sankara, one of the legendary figures of contemporary Africa. Using the synthetic control approach, we design a counterfactual for the actual Burkina Faso called synthetic Burkina Faso based on corruption before Sankara's tenure. The difference between Burkina Faso and Synthetic Burkina Faso highlights that the leadership of Thomas Sankara substantially reduced corruption in Burkina Faso during his tenure from 1983 to 1987. This reduction effect in 1987 was as much as 70 percent of the 1982 level of corruption in the country. This result is robust to placebo tests. This finding highlights the leader's importance in shaping African countries' institutional trajectory. To fight corruption, having an exemplary leader is a cure.


Presentations: Colloque internationale sur Thomas Sankara et le Développement, Burkina Faso (2022), Institute for Corruption Studies (ICS) 4th Workshop on Corruption, Italy (2022) and  EAERE-ETH European Winter School, Switzerland (2023).


Work in Progress

"Corruption and democratic transition in Africa” (with Luc Désiré Omgba et Dramane Coulibaly)

”Corruption of police officers and crimes in Mali”