Recherche

Poste d’enseignement et de recherche (post-doctorat) en Sciences Economiques à l’ENSAI - CREST DOMAINES DE RECHERCHE
  • Corruption et institutions
  • Evaluation des Politiques Publiques
  • Econométrie Appliquée
  • Finances publiques
  • Histoire économique
  • Microéconomie Appliquée / Macroéconomie Appliquée
Bureau 254 Téléphone 3334 Email harouna.sedgo@ensai.fr Adresse ENSAI
Campus de Ker Lann
51 Rue Blaise Pascal
BP 37203
35172 BRUZ Cedex

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Situation actuelle et précédentes

Oct. 2023- Sept. 2024: Poste d’enseignement et de recherche (post-doctorat) en Sciences Economiques à l’ENSAI - CREST

 

Sept 2021- Août 2023: Attaché Temporaire d’Enseignement et de Recherche (ATER) en Sciences Economiques à l’Université Paris Nanterre.

Chercheur au sein d’EconomiX - CNRS (UMR 7235) - Université Paris Nanterre.

Depuis Fev 2022 -  Membre de American Economic Association (AEA).

 

Formation :

2018- 2022 - Doctorat en Sciences Economiques, EconomiX, Université Paris Nanterre.

Titre de thèse: Corruption in Africa: effect on resource allocation and the role of leadership
Superviseur : Luc Désiré Omgba, Professeur des universités, Université de Lorraine

Proposition pour un prix de thèse et subvention pour publication.

Thèse soutenue le 30 Septembre 2022 devant le jury composé de :

 Pascale Combes Motel, Professeure des universités, Rapporteure - Université Clermont Auvergne
 Dramane Coulibaly, Professeur des universités, Rapporteur - Université Lumière Lyon 2
 Christian Ebeke, Senior Economist, Examinateur - Fonds monétaire international –FMI-
 Elise Huillery, Professeure des universités, Examinatrice - Université Paris Dauphine, PSL
 Valérie Mignon, Professeure des universités, Présidente - Université Paris Nanterre

 Luc Désiré Omgba, Professeur des universités, Superviseur - Université de Lorraine

 

 

2018: Master 2 recherche en Economie internationale et développement, Université Paris Dauphine, France; Résultat: Mention Bien
 
 

Enseignements: (672h)

2023 - 2024 (Post-doctorat à l'ENSAI)

Cours Magistraux: Economie internationale (L3), Macroéconomie (L3)

Travaux dirigés (TD): Econométrie appliquée (2A), Microéconomie (1A), Economie du développement (1A)

Encadrement: supervisuer pour le projet d'économie (8 groupes)

Publications (peer-reviewed)

Abstract:

This study investigates the effect of corruption on the trade-off between capital and current expenditures in a panel of 48 African countries over the period 2000–2016. Based on statistical yearbooks, we compile disaggregated data on public finances for African countries and find that a high prevalence of corruption distorts the composition of public expenditures at the expense of the share of capital expenditure. Specifically, an increase in corruption by one standard deviation is associated with a decrease in the proportion of capital expenditure from 29 to 18%. The results are robust to various specifications and estimation methods, including the fixed effects and instrumental variables approach. The supportive argument demonstrates that it seems more beneficial for corrupted bureaucrats to manipulate public spending in favor of current rather than capital expenditures. The latter relies on formal and traceable procedures, whereas current expenditure is known to be more open to the use of discretionary allocation.


Presentations: International Conference on Culture, Institutions and Economic Development, Italy (2019), Centre for the Study of African Economies - CSAE -  Conference 2021: Economic Development in Africa, United Kingdom (2021).

 
 
Working Papers 
 

Abstract: 

This paper assesses the incentive effect of corruption on occupational choice. Based on survey data and information about actual wages, including allowances per position in the civil service, we provide a new measure of public officials' corruption based on the difference between the perceived and actual wages for each position. With this measure, we find that corruption increases the civil service choice for a professional career. Evidence across alternative scenarios and methodologies, including instrumental variables, suggests this effect is causal. This finding explains, in part, the constraints associated with the job market and the rush to the civil service in Africa.

Presentations: International Conference on Development Economics (2022), Brown Bag Seminar at ENSAI (2024), Centre for the Study of African Economies - CSAE -  Conference 2024: Economic Development in Africa, United Kingdom (2024).

 

Abstract:

This study assesses the role of a leader in anti-corruption fighting in Africa. It focuses on the rule of Thomas Sankara, one of the legendary figures of contemporary Africa. Using the synthetic control approach, we design a counterfactual for the actual Burkina Faso called synthetic Burkina Faso based on corruption before Sankara's tenure. The difference between Burkina Faso and Synthetic Burkina Faso highlights that the leadership of Thomas Sankara substantially reduced corruption in Burkina Faso during his tenure from 1983 to 1987. This reduction effect in 1987 was as much as 70 percent of the 1982 level of corruption in the country. This result is robust to placebo tests. This finding highlights the leader's importance in shaping African countries' institutional trajectory. To fight corruption, having an exemplary leader is a cure.

 

Presentations: Colloque internationale sur Thomas Sankara et le Développement, Burkina Faso (2022), Institute for Corruption Studies (ICS) 4th Workshop on Corruption, Italy (2022) and  EAERE-ETH European Winter School, Switzerland (2023).

 

Work in Progress

"Corruption and democratic transition in Africa” (with Luc Désiré Omgba et Dramane Coulibaly)

Corruption of police officers and crimes in Mali